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Abstract
Social accountability is increasingly invoked as a way of improving health services. This article
presents a theory-driven qualitative study of the context, mechanisms and outcomes of a social ac-
countability program, Citizen Voice and Action (CVA), implemented by World Vision (WV) in
Zambia. Primary data were collected between November 2013 and January 2014. It included in-
depth interviews and focus group discussions with program stakeholders. Secondary data were
used iteratively—to inform the process for primary data collection, to guide primary data analysis
and to contextualize findings from the primary data. CVA positively impacted the state, society,
state–society relations and development coordination at the local level. Specifically, sustained im-
provements in some aspects of health system responsiveness, empowered citizens, the improved
provision of public goods (health services) and increased consensus on development issues ap-
peared to flow from CVA. The central challenge described by interviewees and FGD participants
was the inability of CVA to address problems that required central level input. The mechanisms
that generated these outcomes included productive state–society communication, enhanced trust,
and state–society co-production of priorities and the provision of services. These mechanisms
were activated in the context of existing structures for state–society interaction, willing political
leaders, buy-in by traditional leaders, and WV’s strong reputation and access to resources.
Prospective observational research in multiple contexts would shed more light on the context,
mechanisms and outcomes of CVA programs. In addition to findings that are intuitive and well sup-
ported in the literature we identified new areas that are promising areas for future research. These
include (1) the context of organizational reputation by the organization(s) spearheading social ac-
countability efforts; (2) the potential relationship between social accountability efforts and making
ambitious national programs operational at the frontlines of the health system and (3) the feasibil-
ity of scale up for certain types of local level responsiveness.
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Introduction
Greater accountability is increasingly invoked as necessary to im-
proving the coverage and quality of health services in low and mid-
dle income countries (Freedman and Schaaf 2013; Joshi 2013;
Lodenstein, Dielman, Gerretsen and Broerse 2013). The consensus
definition of accountability encompasses answerability and enforce-
ability. Governments are obligated to provide information and justi-
fication regarding policy and practice (answerability), and sanctions
must exist for failure to comport with policy (enforceability)
(Schedler 1999; Goetz and Gaventa 2001; Brinkerhoff 2004). In
addition to sanctions, more normative approaches describe how
professional or social norms favoring accountability can engender
enforceability (O’Connell 2005; Bovens 2010; Freedman and Schaaf
2013). Such focus on norms echoes increasing acknowledgement of
the import of health systems “software,” such as norms, values and
power in shaping health service delivery (Sheikh, Gilson, Agyepong,
Hanson, Ssengooba and Bennett 2011). Social accountability is an
area of growing research and programmatic interest in the broader
accountability field; it consists of “ongoing and collective effort[s]
to hold public officials to account for the provision of public goods
which are existing state obligations” (Houtzager and Joshi 2008;
Gullo, Galavotti and Altman, 2016). Thus, these collective efforts
are intended to engender answerability and enforceability, poten-
tially by ensuring existing rules are followed, by changing the rules,
and/or by transforming health systems software.
Though there is widespread acknowledgement that context is
key to the implementation and impact of social accountability ef-
forts, and thus that program processes and outcomes are somewhat
unique to each setting, broadly applicable lessons on social account-
ability implementation and impact are emerging. This study contrib-
utes to that evidence base by presenting empirical data from a
theory-driven qualitative study of a social accountability program
implemented by World Vision (WV) in Zambia, and by strongly
contextualizing this data in the existing literature on social account-
ability. The study was undertaken in three districts. The article is in-
tended to inform program implementers, donors and other
stakeholders about aspects of context, mechanisms and outcomes
that might be considered in the application of a social accountability
program theory in Zambia and beyond. We also suggest areas of fu-
ture consideration and research for program implementers and
health systems researchers.
Social accountability and health evidence base
Joshi (2014) has proposed three different domains of impact for so-
cial accountability: (1) state, (2) social and (3) state–society rela-
tions. We looked at these domains at the local level. First, impact on
the state may include outcomes such as reduced corruption and
more responsive public officials (Gaventa and McGee 2013; Joshi
2013, 2014). Second, social accountability efforts may enhance so-
cial goods, such as improved provision of public goods, empowered
citizens and increased social cohesion (Gaventa and McGee 2013;
Joshi 2014). Third, impact on state–society relations may include
the creation of institutional channels for state/society interaction
and an increase in perceived state legitimacy (Gaventa and McGee
2013; Joshi 2014). While the intrinsic value of some of these im-
pacts, such as empowerment and trust, are contested (Gaventa and
McGee 2013; Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014), we work from
the premise that they are valuable as intermediate outcomes (Topp,
Chipukuma and Hanefeld, 2015), as well as development outcomes
in their own right, particularly in the context of government health
systems in low and middle income countries, where “[n]eglect, abuse
and exclusion by the health system . . . [can be] part of the very ex-
perience of being poor” (Freedman 2005).
A diverse array of strategies can be described as “social account-
ability.” We study Citizen Voice and Action (CVA), which combines
aspects of two fairly common approaches, namely ‘community
scorecards’ and ‘social audit’.
CVA traces its origins to the World Bank’s Community-Based
Performance Monitoring (CBPM) piloted in the Gambia, which was
in turn derived from the international non-governmental organiza-
tion (NGO) CARE’s Community Score Card process as imple-
mented in Malawi (Winterford 2009). CBPM enhanced the
traditional Community Score Card approach by including national
service delivery standards (e.g. standards for hospital cleanliness) as
well as perception-based indicators that are generated by the com-
munity (through focus group discussions), such as health facility
staff punctuality.
We describe the program theory below. CVA has been used in
many domains, including health and education. Our description of
the program theory focuses on the assumptions and activities that
are most relevant to health.
The CVA program theory is premised on information, voice, dia-
logue and accountability. The program provides opportunities for
citizens to learn what their rights are by facilitating greater
Key Messages
• Social accountability consists of citizen efforts to hold the government to account for the provision of essential services.
It is increasingly invoked as a way of improving governmental health services.
• Citizen Voice and Action (CVA), a social accountability effort combining community score cards and social audit proc-
esses, positively impacted the state, society, state–society relations and development coordination in Zambia.
Specifically, sustained improvements in health system responsiveness, empowered citizens, the improved provision of
public goods (health services) and increased consensus on development issues appeared to flow from CVA. The mech-
anisms that generated these outcomes included productive state–society communication, enhanced trust, and state–so-
ciety co-production of priorities and the provision of services.
• In addition to findings that are intuitive and well supported in the literature we identified new areas that are promising
areas for future research. These include (1) the context of organizational reputation by the organization(s) spearheading
social accountability efforts; (2) the potential relationship between social accountability efforts and making ambitious na-
tional programs operational at the frontlines of the health system and (3) the feasibility of scale up for certain types of
local level responsiveness.
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transparency and access to national service delivery standards, as
well as by supporting citizens to articulate standards (“perception-
based indicators”) and generate their own information. The national
service delivery standards used differ by setting; in Zambia, the
health standards used relate to maternal health care and primary
health care. Once they are empowered with greater information,
citizens express their voice through channels provided by CVA, and
over the long-term, through other channels that are enabled by
CVA. As a result of the expression of citizen voice, providers obtain
more information about citizen priorities and challenges. Providers
learn more about citizens because citizen and service provider voices
are expressed in a 2-way dialogue, which builds understanding and
trust among those present, and also provides an opportunity for the
creation of partnerships to improve service delivery. According to
WV’s program theory, citizens demand accountability through their
expression of voice, but the accountability emerging from CVA is
not just about providers being more accountable to communities.
“The primary objective of CVA is to increase dialogue and account-
ability between three groups: citizens, public service providers and
government officials (political and administration) to improve the
delivery of public services” (WV 2016). Thus, the program theory
appears to target all stakeholders. Yet, the normative document for
CVA recognizes the fact that some hold more power than others; a
key objective of citizen voice is to “influence[s] government proc-
esses and services” . . . ultimately, “hold[ing] power holders account-
able” (WV 2016).
As shown in Figure 1, the program occurs in three, iterative
phases. The first phase entails WV-led relationship building with
communities and service providers and stakeholder mobilization to
inform the community and relevant actors about the goals and com-
ponents of CVA. Next, WV convenes an open community gathering
during which a CVA Committee is formed, usually by a consensus
process. About 10–15 people join; membership is voluntary. CVA
Committee members are often also members of other community
structures, such as village development committees and neighbour-
hood health committees. Insofar as possible, WV tries to facilitate
the creation of a diverse CVA Committee, so that the Committee
has widespread legitimacy.
Following facilitation from WV, representatives from the gov-
ernment educate communities about relevant legislation and na-
tional service delivery standards. Citizens may have preferences and
priorities that are not formally enshrined in national standards, thus
they also articulate standards (“perception-based indicators”) that
they think their local facility should meet. In the second phase, the
health facility’s (or other service provider’s, depending on the con-
text) realization of both perception-based indicators and national
service delivery standards are assessed. A social audit process is used
with service providers and communities to assess performance of the
clinics against national service delivery standards. Here, citizens and
service providers observe the facility and look at facility data to as-
sess to what extent the facility is compliant with national service de-
livery standards. Then, citizens and service providers use community
score cards to rate their health facilities against the perception-based
indicators. Third, citizens, local elected representatives and service
providers, convene interface meetings. They discuss the service deliv-
ery gaps identified and elaborate action plans to address some of
these challenges. Action plans identify individuals and groups re-
sponsible for each action. The plans are then implemented and
monitored in subsequent interface meetings. The three phases are re-
peated, as communities and the government tackle increasingly diffi-
cult challenges.
In Zambia, WV initiated CVA in the three rural districts covered
by this study in 2008, with a focus on two sectors: health and educa-
tion. The five health facilities directly engaged in CVA in these three
rural districts are at the primary care level. WV Zambia is now lead-
ing CVA in 16 of Zambia’s 103 districts, across all 10 provinces of
Figure 1. Overview of the CVA process
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Zambia. It is also important to note that as of February 2016, CVA
is being implemented in hundreds of sites in 45 countries globally.
Several of these sites are the subject of ongoing research.
Study setting
Zambian health system
Demand on primary health services is high, driven partly by im-
provements in life expectancy, the introduction of HIV care and
treatment services at the primary health care level, high rates of fer-
tility, and migration to urban and peri-urban areas (Masiye, Chitah,
Chanda and Simeo 2008; National AIDS Council and Government
of the Republic of Zambia 2012).
Against this backdrop of growing demographic and epidemio-
logic pressures, a chronic shortage of human resources for health
continues to affect Zambian primary health care. In 2006, the
Ministry of Health reported there were only 646 doctors to the
country’s then 12 million population (MOH and GRZ 2006).
Between 2008 and 2010 staffing levels improved but still fell far
below international recommendations (Herbst, Vledder, Campbell,
Sjoblom and Soucat 2011). Healthcare workers are also highly un-
evenly distributed (Schatz 2008).
Due in part to the pressures cited above, numerous concerns
about clinical quality and health system responsiveness have been
identified in Zambia, including lack of respect for patients, lack of
provision of information, inexcusable delays in the provision of
care, and burdensome out-of-pocket payments (Phiri, Fylkesnes,
Ruano and Moland, 2014).
Five WV CVA sites in three districts were included in this study,
namely Chibombo, Mumbwa and Lufwanyama. These sites were
chosen because they were the pilot sites for CVA in Zambia, and are
thus the locations where CVA had been implemented the longest.
The three districts are largely rural. Chibombo and Mumbwa are in
Central Province and Lufwanyama is in the Copperbelt Province.
The districts have varying levels of socioeconomic development.
Each CVA site is comprised of a primary health care facility and the
catchment area. It is important to note that the CVA Committee is
based in the village where the health facility is located. Committee
members travel and hold events in other villages, but they are less
regularly present in villages that are formally part of the health facil-
ity catchment area, but that are at the edges of the catchment area.
Study aim and methods
Recent literature from interdisciplinary research on health systems
explains that health systems are complex adaptive systems, charac-
terized by interdependent relationships, contingent constellations of
power and non-linearity (Handler, Issel and Turnock 2001; Adam
and de Savigny 2012). These systems reflect and enact dynamics of
social and political power, such that the health system is not merely
a mechanistic service delivery system (Gilson 2003; Freedman
2005). The delivery of health services depends on the active inputs
of individuals, which are embedded in the larger health system con-
text. For example, health care workers provide care, adhere to
guidelines, interact with each other and interact with patients ac-
cording to their personal values, social and professional norms and
larger health system infrastructure, among other factors. In brief,
providers, patients and others exercise agency according to their rea-
soning and resources (Pawson, Greenhalgh, Harvey and Walshe
2005; Dalkin, Greenhalgh, Jones, Cunningham and Lhussier 2015).
It is in this context that social accountability efforts seek to effect
change.
We sought to make tentative, contextualized programmatic and
theoretical propositions about how the CVA program theory was
realized in the health sector in 3 of Zambia’s 103 districts. The study
aimed to answer:
1. How does CVA affect the relationship between citizens and the
health sector?
2. How does the health sector respond to CVA?
3. What elements of context facilitate or hinder positive change in
the health sector in response to CVA?
Answering these questions required identifying and understand-
ing the program outcomes, and the mechanisms that, in the given
context, engendered these outcomes. Context, mechanism and out-
come configurations are facets of “realist evaluation”, which is one
of several approaches in the broader field of theory-driven research
(Pawson 2013). This approach to analysis seeks to understand what
works, for whom and under what circumstances, rather than the
more common approach of simply examining activities or other eas-
ily observable inputs (Lodenstein, Dielman, Gerretsen and Broerse
2013). Among others, there are two principles of realist evaluation
that make it particularly apt for examining CVA in a health systems
context. First, realism assumes that all systems are “open” systems,
meaning that the boundaries among given systems—such as the
health system and the community—are permeable and changeable
(Westhorp, Walker, Rogers, Overbeeke, Ball and Brice 2014). This
facilitates understanding of CVA’s intent to change relationships
within societies and across the state/society divide, as well as elem-
ents of context that shape the outcomes of such efforts. Second, ob-
servable changes, such as more polite health care workers, are
generally caused by non-observable processes, termed “mechan-
isms” (Westhorp, Walker, Rogers, Overbeeke, Ball and Brice 2014).
“Mechanisms” are thus distinct from activities; they are the underly-
ing processes that operate in particular contexts to generate out-
comes (Astbury and Leeuw 2010; Dalkin, Greenhalgh, Jones,
Cunningham and Lhussier 2015). The “causal powers” of a pro-
gram relate to what resources the program provides, what ‘reason-
ing’ is induced in response, and what behaviour changes are
generated (Westhorp, Walker, Rogers, Overbeeke, Ball and Brice
2014). Some research and evaluations of social accountability have
been criticized for focusing on activities, or social accountability
“tools”, rather than on how change happens (Joshi and Houtzager
2012; Gaventa and McGee 2013; Fox 2015). In contrast, a focus
on mechanisms militates against such widgetization, or taking a
tool-focused approach that is blind to human relations and power
dynamics. Instead, we seek to understand how social accountability
efforts occur in a larger accountability ecosystem (Joshi and
Houtzager 2012; Cornish 2015; Halloran 2015). Moreover, close
attention to context and underlying change processes facilitates
context-sensitive conclusions, ultimately contributing to more edu-
cated uptake of research evidence into practice (Marchal, van Belle,
van Olmen, Hoeree and Kegels 2012; Reddy, Wakerman, Westhorp
and Herring 2016). Given that CVA and similar programs are
currently being implemented in hundreds of sites, prudent use of
research evidence is key.
A full-fledged realist evaluation would typically require longitu-
dinal engagement with program participants and stakeholders.
Moreover, given CVA’s widespread use, a rigorous realist evalu-
ation would entail looking at multiple countries. Thus, we describe
this study as a realist informed qualitative study, an approach that
has been taken in other contexts where researchers feel that the con-
text, mechanisms, and outcomes framing would add value to extant
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data (Shankardass, Renahy, Muntaner, O’Campo 2014; Kok,
Ormel, Broerse et al. 2016). Drawing from insights in health systems
research, this study design highlights the contingent, embedded, and
iterative nature of social accountability efforts.
Further, by focusing on underlying change processes and the con-
texts that affect how they work, it offers a different way of assessing
whether findings are portable to other situations.
Data collection
To answer the questions above and to ensure the practical and the-
oretical relevance of the study, we used both primary and secondary
data.
Secondary data were used iteratively. Secondary data included
WV program documents, score cards and action plans generated by
CVA activities, and materials WV developed summarizing health en-
titlements. More importantly, we also reviewed articles regarding
social accountability in all domains (not just health), as well as
health systems and policy research articles relating to relationships
within health systems and between communities and the health sys-
tem. Because a significant amount of research on social accountabil-
ity has not been published in peer-reviewed literature, we included
some grey literature in our search. These articles were identified
through an initial literature search on “social accountability” in
Google and Google Scholar, but the list was augmented iteratively
as new resources were identified through follow up on the citations
of those on the initial list, or, as new articles were published. All art-
icles identified (n¼63) were hand coded thematically. These sec-
ondary data sources were used to inform the development of
interview tools and of deductive codes, and, iteratively, to context-
ualize findings from the primary data (though only 45 had been
identified and coded before tool development, such that only 45
were used for this purpose). The authors continuously moved back
and forth between the peer-reviewed literature and the data during
the analysis phase, assessing to what extent findings from other
studies were supported and contradicted in our data, as well as iden-
tifying which findings and questions arising from our data had seem-
ingly not arisen in previous studies. In this way, this study is part of
a larger process of aggregating knowledge on program theory for so-
cial accountability (Manzano-Santaella 2011).
Primary data were collected between November 2013 and
January 2014. CVA had started in these communities in 2008. At
the time the research was conducted, the program was ongoing in
all of them. Methods used included in-depth interviews with district
health officials (n¼5), traditional community leaders (n¼2), rural
health centre staff from one facility in each of the three sites (n¼4),
WV staff based in the districts under study (n¼8) and WV staff
based in Lusaka (n¼1). Focus groups were also conducted with
CVA members in each of the three sites (n¼27). The interview and
focus group discussion guides were developed based on our research
questions, as well as findings from other studies on social account-
ability and/or health systems in low and middle income countries
that we felt may be apt. Specifically, to try to address the research
questions in the given context, we developed the tools to explore
elements of context, mechanisms, and outcomes that were found to
be relevant in other social accountability programs.
Recruitment was carried out via verbal invitation, issued by WV
staff to members of the CVA Committee. The Committee members
were asked to report to a nominated location on a particular day; all
individuals doing so on the assigned day were eligible to participate.
They were given information about the study and its goals, and
asked to provide written informed consent. The Chibombo,
Lufwanyama and Mumbwa focus groups included 7, 15 and 6 par-
ticipants, respectively, including a mix of men and women.
This study focuses on the health sector, though we did not stop
participants when they spoke about relevant changes in the educa-
tion sector or other domains. Participants reported on their experi-
ences with CVA from its initiation to the present.
The study team visited each site for 2–3 days. Rural health clinic
staff were recruited with the assistance of WV, who informed the
staff when the research team would visit. All interviews and focus
groups were led by trained research assistants in the local language
of the interviewee’s choice. They were recorded and transcribed.
Where needed, the transcripts were translated into English. All were
imported into QSR NVivo 10.
The study received ethical approval from the Eres Converge
Institutional Review Board (IRB) in Zambia and from the Columbia
University Medical Center IRB in New York City, USA. Relevant offi-
cials from Mumbwa, Lufwanyama and Chibombo Districts provided
written permission for study activities to take place.
Data analysis
Initial deductive codes were developed based on the literature. These
codes related to context, mechanisms and outcomes. We did not cat-
egorize the codes as relating to (or comprising) context, mechanism,
or outcomes until later in the analysis process, as many could fall
under more than one rubric. For example, mutual trust between the
community and health providers might be considered to be a mech-
anism generating increased health service utilization, or, it could be
considered to be an intrinsically important outcome on its own. MS
and ST each examined five transcripts to refine the deductive codes
and to develop inductive codes in a focused coding process
(Charmaz 2006). We went back and forth between the literature
and the data several times, and consulted with MN in a continual
process of assessing and finalizing the codes. As we iteratively de-
veloped literature-based codes that accommodated emerging find-
ings, our analytic process can be described as deductive, indicative,
and abductive (Timmermans and Tavory 2012).
Once the codes were finalized, we re-coded all transcripts. To en-
sure consistent coding, MS and ST coded 10 of the transcripts
jointly. They divided the remaining 13 transcripts, with an overlap
of 3 transcripts. The percentage agreement on these was three tran-
scripts was 97.4%. We judged percentage agreement to be the most
appropriate indicator of consistent coding since the likelihood of
guessing was low (McHugh 2012).
After looking at the coded data in its totality, we decided to define
outcomes as the most downstream consequence for which we had ad-
equate data to at least partially attribute to CVA. We relied on the
Joshi typology, though we ultimately added a category. Finally, we
also considered what study participants described as outcomes. We
categorized the underlying processes for which we had adequate data
to conclude had engendered the outcomes as mechanisms. We were
especially likely to label such processes mechanisms (rather than out-
comes) if the data indicated they contributed to multiple outcomes.
Codes were grouped into larger themes, with each code being
included in multiple themes. The themes addressed aspects of the
context, potential mechanisms, and outcomes of CVA. Brief ana-
lyses were written on each theme. In addition, a data display
describing all putative outcomes of CVA was made. This display
included outcomes falling under Joshi’s three domains of impact as
they occurred at the local level (state, society and state–society rela-
tions). Over time, we added a fourth category, impact on develop-
ment coordination. We then expanded this data display to include
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related findings in a few other key reviews and studies on social ac-
countability for health. This allowed us to firmly ground our find-
ings in the literature.
Results and discussion
The following section describes and contextualizes the results of our
study. After discussing the process of CVA itself, we apply Joshi’s
domains of impact to our local level outcomes. Consistent with our
realist orientation, we then hypothesize mechanisms that underlie
the outcomes observed, and, finally, the elements of the context that
facilitated activation of the mechanisms. As noted, we did not con-
duct a full-fledged realist evaluation. For this reason, we did not at-
tempt to elaborate context, mechanism, and outcome
configurations. We felt that the contextual variation among the sites
was too limited—or our ability to ascertain this variation was inad-
equate—as the interviews were too few and we lacked the prospect-
ive observation data we would have preferred. Thus, we did not feel
confident making assertions about relationships within context,
mechanism and outcome configurations. For example, we had
ample evidence to assert that “existing structures facilitating state/
society collaboration” enabled multiple mechanisms, but did not
have sufficient evidence to say that it was not a contributing aspect
of context for other mechanisms. Moreover, some of the mechan-
isms identified are inter-related and synergistic; they can be
described as emergent properties of a well-functioning health system
(Topp and Chipukuma 2015; Topp, Chipukuma and Hanefeld
2015). In other words, they are not independent variables with addi-
tive impact on health system functioning, but attributes that are nur-
tured by CVA that in turn nurture each other and further engender
health system improvements. Several of the mechanisms work in
concert. Again, given the somewhat circumscribed nature of the re-
search, we did not feel it appropriate to propose configurations that
ignored these complexities, or to propose complex configurations
without sufficient empirical basis. Thus, we propose context, mech-
anism and outcome factors for further empiric investigation.
Process of CVA
Respondent descriptions of CVA matched the WV program model;
program fidelity was high. As designed, the program allows for dif-
ferent timeframes and adaptation according to context. For ex-
ample, moving through the three phases—enabling citizen
engagement, engagement via community gathering, improving ser-
vices and influencing policy—may require multiple meetings in a
short timeframe, or it may require many meetings with various
stakeholders over a long timeframe.
We also assessed to what extent the process was characterized by
elite capture. Some researchers have found that individuals engaged
in social accountability are wealthier and more educated than the
average citizen, and thus may not advocate for issues that affect the
most excluded (Mansuri and Rao 2004; Fox 2015; Grandvoinnet,
Aslam and Raha 2015). To some degree, this capture may be inevit-
able, as social accountability addresses collective goals, and engage-
ment of those with power, such as traditional leaders and Health
Committee members, is both unavoidable and necessary. Review of
the FGD transcripts suggests that while there were members of CVA
Committees who were among the village elite, not all were. Issues
such as adequate drugs or health worker absenteeism seemingly af-
fect most, if not all, users of the health facility.
Outcomes of CVA
Below are the outcomes that came through in our data. We put
them into four broad domains, and we also provide more specific
descriptions within each domain. Domains 1–3 (state responsive-
ness, social, state–society relations) occurred largely at the local
level, while the fourth domain (development coordination) occurred
largely at the district level.
Domain of outcome 1: state responsiveness
Most priorities identified in CVA action plans require at least a one-
time state response, if not a consistent change in practice by govern-
mental employees. We understood state responsiveness to include
improved health worker response. Interviewees in all sites described
more polite and timely treatment by health care workers as flowing
from CVA. A few referred to decreased absenteeism. Many commu-
nity members also described feeling that they had more access to dis-
trict officials. These findings are all common in the literature,
although enhanced access to government officials is somewhat less
frequent (Joshi 2010; Bjorkman, De Walque and Svensson 2014;
Ho, Labrecque, Batonon, Salsi and Ratnayake 2015; Wild, Wales
and Chambers 2015).
This quote from FGD participants in Mumbwa is illustrative of
their general satisfaction with CVA and its health sector responsive-
ness outcomes:
I can say in the health system there is a great change [. . .] now-
adays the health service providers have changed their work cul-
ture in a positive way. In the past they used to report late for
work and you will find that they used to rebuke or ridicule us a
lot.
Health providers, too, acknowledged these changes. Some ex-
plained these changes were reciprocal; they described being more
inclined to be responsive in part because they felt the community was
more understanding of their challenges, limitations, and mandate.
It is not easy working in a [Health] centre like here because you
are doing everyone’s job, so you are tired. [A] person will come
and approach me and if I am very rude they will [. . .] shy away.
But now it is like they understand. When they approach you they
will explain and you know even you yourself will be bad to turn
away someone like that. (Health provider, Chibombo)
This improved responsiveness became an expectation. Once
behaviours improved, CVA Committee members were not afraid to
demand that service providers answer for perceived transgressions
of this “new normal”. In these cases, enforceability was realized.
In the past [service providers] used to report late for work and
you would find that they used to rebuke or ridicule us a lot. But
nowadays if we see a health service provider is rebuking a patient
we are quick to take action and remind them of their responsibil-
ities and also that patient’s rights to be attended to. (FGD
Participant, Mumbwa).
Domain of outcomes 2: social
Society level outcomes included empowered citizens, the improved
provision of public goods and increased consensus on development
issues.
Citizen empowerment began in part with increased knowledge.
In all three districts, interviewees reported that CVA positively
impacted individual and community knowledge, particularly in
relation to understanding health entitlements and minimum
standards for local health facilities. This finding is ubiquitous in
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peer reviewed literature on social accountability and service
delivery, which shows that while information is usually not
sufficient, it can play a determinative role in affecting change
through social accountability campaigns (Bjorkman and Svensson
2007; Reinikka and Svensson 2011; Gaventa and McGee 2013;
Joshi 2013; Papp, Gogoi and Campbell 2013; Bjorkman, de Walque
and Svensson 2014; Fox 2015; Ho, Labrecque, Batonon, Salsi and
Ratnayake 2015).
CVA has changed a lot of things. [For example] helping us learn-
ing about government policies. Without knowledge of govern-
ment policies you wouldn’t even know what’s happening [. . .] We
were taught and now the fear has gone. (FGD Participant,
Lufwanyama)
CVA members in the three districts additionally reported that
CVA activities improved their own and their communities’ under-
standing of decision-making processes. This too, has been found in
earlier studies (Papp, Gogoi and Campbell 2013) but it is a less com-
mon finding. CVA Committee members linked their newfound pol-
icy knowledge and understanding of government processes to
empowerment.
So this time we really know how to approach the govern-
ment[. . .]and tell them: Here there is a mistake. Me [I] am a citi-
zen and [I] have rights in such a way. (Headman, Mumbwa)
[I]n the past we were very ignorant. But when CVA was brought
to us and they explained [. . .] I truly felt that I was a citizen, a na-
tional citizen. One who is given powers to speak out when I
realize that things are not going in the manner they are supposed
to be. (FGD Participant, Chibombo)
The collective aspect of CVA also seemed to engender collective
empowerment. This is important since expressing voice requires in-
dividuals to sometimes take social risks in settings where they have
traditionally lacked power. Respondents referred to a ‘strength in
numbers’ phenomenon.
Finally, citizens stated that they felt empowered in part because
they saw concrete results in the improved provision of public goods
(health and education), a virtuous circle that is part of the program
theory of CVA and that has been identified in other settings (Joshi
2008). Table 1 summarizes specific descriptions of improved provi-
sion of health services, as well as the resources used to effect the
improvements.
These outcomes can be grouped into several broad categories.
Table 2 delineates these categories and indicates whether or not
other studies of social accountability and health have had similar
findings.
In addition to these improvements in the provision of public
goods, interviewees and FGD participants explained that CVA pro-
moted social consensus on key development priorities within com-
munities. These priorities are shared by World Vision, the
Government of Zambia and other development partners.
Participants explained that Government of Zambia policies on prac-
tices such as early marriage were included in score card standards,
ensuring that they were discussed at CVA-related awareness raising
and interface meetings. Table 3 summarizes these putative changes.
Table 1. Improved provision of public goods in three sites with CVA activity
Site Improved provision of public goods Resources
Lufwanyama Mothers’ shelter built (accommodation near to clinic for pregnant
women who are close to term)
Foundation bricks contributed by community; funding from
Constituency Development Funds (CDF) and WV
Four new beds in labour ward WV and Save the Children
Medical licentiate and nurse hired, one of whom was since
transferred
Government health budget
Increased availability of essential drugs (allocation of essential
drug kids to health centre increased)
Government health budget
Chibombo Environmental Health Technician and Midwife hired Government health budget
Increased availability of essential drugs (allocation of essential
drug kids to health centre increased)
Government health budget
Mumbwa Bore holes repaired Inputs from NGOs that initially constructed bore holes, with
some money and time offered by the community
New rural clinic constructed
Houses for rural clinic staff constructed
District gave some cement; community contributed labour and
materials. WV contributed materials for roofs of 4 houses.
Health centre staff now working on weekends, as per policy NA
New clinic wing for maternity care, postnatal care and mother’s
shelter constructed
Community bought crushed stones and sand; NGO contributed
additional funds
Health care workers that were disliked by community transferred
out and new ones were posted
NA
Table 2. Categories of service provision improvements
Type of change Similar findings in the literature
Infrastructure improvement CARE’s CSC facilitated infrastructure improvements in health facilities in four coun-
tries studied. Community and the government contributed (Wild and Harris 2011)
Reduced drug stock outs Reduced drug stock outs in multiple countries (Wild and Harris 2011; Bjorkman, de
Walque and Svensson 2014; Ho, Labrecque, Batonon, Salsi and Ratnayake 2015)
Hiring new staff and transferring unpopular staff Wild and Harris (2011)
Improved staff adherence to policy Bjorkman, de Walque, Svensson 2014; Joshi 2010; Papp, Gogoi and Campbell 2013
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Those changes marked with an asterisk were mentioned by only one
interviewee; the rest were mentioned by more than one.
These shifting dynamics of power are explained by a Mumbwa
FGD participant:
Equally as parents in the past we used to accept and obey what-
ever the headman could say to us even where we could see that
things were wrong. But this time around we have the power to
reject things which are not good for the community and reason
with the headman in matters affecting us.
These specific findings relate to CVA in Zambia, but a few re-
searchers in other settings have described similar changes in gender
dynamics stemming from social accountability projects, such as
community willingness to discuss gender-based violence (Datta,
Jones and Febriany et al. 2011). In general, however, shifting com-
munity norms is an under-explored area in evaluations and studies
of social accountability.
Domain 3 of outcome: state-society relations
State–society relations outcomes included improved functioning of
pre-existing channels for state–society interaction and greater quan-
tity and quality of interactions between citizens and elected leaders.
Participants explained that the CVA interface meetings were a
structured but informal political space for state–society interaction.
As identified in other contexts, interface meetings provide a plat-
form for gathering and aggregating citizen voice, filling a “represen-
tation” role (Wild and Harris 2011; Gaventa and McGee 2013; Fox
2015). The community seemed to understand the interface meeting
as a new channel that enters the “institutional repertoire”, rather
than as a one-time component of a particular project (Joshi and
Schultze-Kraft 2014).
So whenever there is a problem at the health centre or if there is
something we don’t understand we will always call for an inter-
face meeting between us the community, and the health service
providers (Community member, Chibombo).
It also appeared that CVA strengthened the functioning and
transparency of pre-existing channels for state–society interaction,
namely the Neighborhood Health Committees (NHCs). NHCs are
intended to strengthen service accountability by facilitating health
system answerability to an elected group of citizens. CVA
Committees often include members of the local NHC. NHCs report-
edly met more frequently once CVA started. They were tasked with
implementing and monitoring some of the Action Plan items, includ-
ing infrastructure improvements. Through CVA, NHC members
became more aware of what obligations membership entailed and
they were more likely to fulfil these obligations.
Moreover, multiple interviewees stated that NHCs became more
transparent as CVA shifted norms and expectations around access
to information. As explained by a FGD participant in Lufwanyama:
The relationship improved after CVA was introduced. When the
money was allocated to the [NHC] nobody knew [what hap-
pened to it.] But ever since CVA was introduced the [NHC] has
been more transparent.
Other studies have similarly found that social accountability ef-
forts strengthened existing channels for state-society interaction
(Wild and Harris 2011; Westhorp, Walker, Rogers, Overbeeke, Ball
and Brice 2014; Ho, Labrecque, Batonon, Salsi and Ratnayake
2015).
Finally, there were indications that CVA increased and deepened
interactions between citizens and elected leaders. Members of
Parliament (MPs) and local councillors attended interface meetings
to learn what the constituency wanted, and/or because they had
been explicitly engaged by the CVA Committee to play a role in real-
izing action plan priorities.
CVA has helped us in that these days we are able to talk to the
counsellors, MPs . . . and to see whether they are capable of run-
ning the community well once elected. Before CVA came we
were unable to do that for we were afraid to question them.
Similarly, Tembo and Chapman (2014) and Westhorp, Walker,
Rogers, Overbeeke, Ball and Brice (2014) found that local polit-
icians developed a better understanding of local needs through social
accountability efforts. This finding is shared by social accountability
research in some contexts, but not others (Wild and Harris 2011;
Joshi 2013; Ho, Labrecque, Batonon, Salsi and Ratnayake 2015).
Domain 4 of outcomes: development coordination (DC)
We added development coordination as an additional outcomes
area to the three identified by Joshi. Development coordination
could be categorized as a route to improved provision of public
goods, but given the important financial and administrative role de-
velopment support plays in Zambia, it is appropriate to describe this
phenomenon separately.
CVA enhanced development coordination through the interface
meetings and the production of Action Plans. NGO representatives
attended interface or other CVA-related meetings as “stakeholders”
in the issues being discussed. The meetings served as an opportunity
for governmental and non-governmental actors with human and fi-
nancial resources (district health and education officials,
Table 3. CVA promotion of social consensus on key development priorities within communities
Site Social cohesion and consensus on development issues
Lufwanyama CVA Committee mediated between husband and wife*
More meetings within the traditional leadership structure than pre-CVA*
Community more comfortable approaching traditional leadership than pre-CVA*
Decrease in child marriage
Chibombo More men come for first ANC appointment
Increase in activity of neighbourhood health committees
Mumbwa Decrease in early marriage*
Increased reporting of “child defilement”, suggesting increased awareness*
Decrease in traditional methods of addressing child defilement (exchange of cattle)*
Increased acceptance of vaccination within communities that had many refusers (such as certain religious sects)*
Higher educational enrolment as parents are convinced about importance of education, particularly for girls, including
enabling girls to reenrol in school after ‘falling pregnant’*
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community, NGOs, churches, elected officials, donors) to coordin-
ate their inputs.
As explained by a District Health Officer from Chibombo:
[T]hrough CVA, we are able to strengthen the communication
between the cooperating partners and government depart-
ments . . . we can work as a team.
In addition, the Action Plans were described as an expression of
community and local government priorities that had been articu-
lated through a transparent process of consultation and negotiation.
This provided a framework for input from various development
partners. This addition to the typology of social accountability out-
comes is novel in the literature. We are unaware of any research that
has identified social accountability programs as a mechanism for
donor coordination.
Challenges
Unsurprisingly, given its objective to transform relationships and im-
prove service delivery, CVA faced a range of challenges spanning
political, work culture, and operational issues. The central and
recurring challenge described by interviewees and FGD participants
was the inability of CVA to address problems that required central
level input. Indeed, there are very few examples in the literature of
visible national level change stemming from local level social ac-
countability efforts (Wild and Harris 2011).
WV Zambia intends to support CVA Committees to aggregate
common challenges and advocate vis-a-vis central level authorities.
However, the challenge of central level contribution likely goes be-
yond the question of what districts are permitted to do by policy, to
deeper problems of administrative and financial management across
levels of the government. For example, in Zambia, local level author-
ities often lack the financial capacity to deliver on their mandate be-
cause funds transfers from the central level are delayed (Chikulo
2014). It also raises important questions about the domains of poten-
tial outcomes that exclusively local level social accountability efforts
can have in decentralized settings (Cleary, Molyneux and Gilson
2013).
These challenges may undercut the community’s faith in CVA
and in their district officials, particularly if community members do
not fully understand the chain of de facto and de jure decision-
making. As one official explained:
Most of these [actions] are supposed to be supported from [. . .]
central government [. . .] But the community because they know
us they will say the District Health Office didn’t do anything.
[District Official, Chibombo]
Interviewees and FGD participants also described challenges sur-
rounding long entrenched social and cultural norms. This, too, has been
the object of little study in the published social accountability literature.
While these practices—such as early marriage and corporal punishment
of children—have already been thrown into question by national policy
changes and ongoing national and community level discussions, the
program and those involved in it were nonetheless perceived by some
community-members as a direct challenge to sacrosanct norms.
[W]e have been abusing the rights of children by forcing them
into sexual cleansing. In the beginning most elders thought that
this programme was there to destroy the cultural norms and be-
liefs considering the fact that they have been practising these be-
liefs from time immemorial. [FGD Participant, Chibombo]
Finally, FGD participants and interviewees described several as-
pects of CVA operations that they found constraining. These
included lack of funds for local travel (Committee members travel to
other villages); lack of adequate funds for telephone air time; the
time required to participate, particularly for health providers and
district officials; and high turnover rates in the government, which
resulted in successive government officials needing to be sensitized
and trained by CVA officials and/or community members. Implicit
in some community members’ descriptions was the problem of ‘vol-
unteer fatigue’ indicative of the high opportunity costs of participat-
ing in volunteer activities in settings of endemic poverty (Maes
2015; Topp, Price, Nanyangwe-Moyo, Mulenga, Dennis and
Ngunga 2015). With the exception of high turnover rates in govern-
ment, these challenges are little documented in the peer-reviewed lit-
erature, though they affect the probable sustainability of the project
(Wild and Harris 2011).
Program mechanisms
Several mechanisms contributed to the outcomes above. The nuance
of how these mechanisms are activated in the context of CVA in
Zambia may be unique, but they are broadly similar to mechanisms
that have been identified in other studies of social accountability.
Productive state–society communication
CVA contributed in two distinct ways to strengthening communica-
tion among community members, service providers, district officials,
and elected representatives. First, the project trained CVA commit-
tee members in non-confrontational negotiation and facilitation
skills, with a focus on listening and ‘dialoguing’ to support product-
ive, respectful communication among all participants, including
with district officials and elected representatives. Respondents
described this approach as differing from the more confrontational
approach—such as enumerating and publicizing problems with
health service quality—to engaging service providers that had pre-
vailed in the past. Second, CVA entailed interface meetings that pro-
moted bi-directional information sharing. Community and
government representatives from all three sites emphasized the mu-
tually constitutive nature of the inter-face meetings, where commu-
nity members aired their grievances (supported by data collected via
the community score-card exercise) and asked questions. At the
same time, government officials noted that the meetings provided an
important space for them to be able to explain government policy,
respond to community concerns, and describe the challenges they
faced in trying to strengthen health services.
Enhanced trust
Better and more frequent communication via interface meetings and
the resultant improvements in transparency, answerability and en-
forceability provided a self-reinforcing basis for strengthening the
interpersonal trust between citizens and government officials. In re-
lation to health care, trust has been theorized to be dependent on as-
sessments of competency but also on judgements of reliability,
sincerity, generosity and fairness (Wuthnow 2004). Respondents
described the central role that interface meetings—a low-risk envir-
onment which enabled all parties to raise concerns—played in build-
ing precisely these perceptions of sincerity and fairness among all
stakeholders.
Reflecting relevant theory, trust was built over time (Mayer,
Davis and Schoorman 1995). Repeated and generally positive inter-
actions between CVA members and government officials fortified
trust. CVA members, district officials and healthcare workers,
described the accumulation of positive experiences that enabled
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more frequent and less formal interactions, such as ‘drop-in’ visits to
by CVA members to the District Medical Officer.
Co-production
The trust and communication channels built between communities
and the health system were leveraged in the co-production of health
system improvements. “Co-production” refers to goods that are
jointly produced by citizens and the government (Ostrom 1996;
Joshi and Moore 2004). We include: (1) the elaboration of priorities
and (2) the provision of services and their necessary inputs, as goods
that can be co-produced. First, in all three sites, priorities were cop-
roduced to develop action plans. Respondents explained that steps
toward action plan objectives were often defined with input from
the community and the government:
“We can discuss our concerns in regards to the services provided
by the health workers . . . From their explanation together we will
put our heads together and chart the way forward” (Chibombo,
FGD).
Consistent with empirical findings on social accountability, com-
munity member articulation of priorities at times empowered allies
within the health system to be part of the co-production process
(Fox 1996). Government staff may have lacked the incentive or the
political space to effect change otherwise.
Second, similar to findings in other contexts and as seen in Table
1, some infrastructure improvements were also coproduced (Papp,
Gogoi and Campbell 2013; Bjorkman, de Walque and Svensoon
2014; Ho, Labrecque, Batonon, Salsi and Ratnayake 2015; Wild,
Wales and Chambers 2015). The co-production that we learned
about was temporary, although it seems that in certain circum-
stances, institutionalized co-production could potentially arise from
CVA.
The co-production of action plans and monitoring was described
by various respondents as an important step in generating a sense of
mutual accountability amongst all stakeholders. These findings are
reflective of those from a realist review of accountability and em-
powerment interventions conducted by Westhorp, Walker, Rogers,
Overbeeke, Ball and Brice (2014), who found that ‘mutual
Table 4 Contextual factors contributing to CVA success
Contextual factor Explanation Significance to this study Similar findings in other contexts
Existing structures
promoting state/so-
ciety collaboration
CVA interacted with—and dove-
tailed—government-created mech-
anisms for community participation
in development (e.g. Area
Development Coordination
Committees, Safe Motherhood
Action Groups)
• Existence of these groups reflected
stated governmental commitment to
inclusive community participation
• Groups provided scaffolding for the
conduct and realization of CVA activ-
ities and goals, as they were sometimes
charged with conducting or monitoring
the implementation of some CVA ac-
tion plan activities
• CVA enhanced efficacy of these groups
by reducing social risks for community
members and/or health centre man-
agers who used these structures
complain
Evans (2012), Zulu, Michelo,
Msoni, Hurtig, Byskov and
Blystad (2014), Chikulo
(2014), Ensor, Green, Quigley,
Badru, Kaluba and Kureya
(2014). [example only]
Willing political
leaders
Political leadership both facilitated—
and was strengthened by – CVA
• Locally elected councillors were gener-
ally happy to participate in interface
and other meetings, albeit with some
wariness regarding the CVA agenda
• Respect for the material and moral au-
thority of elected positions promoted
community engagement, particularly
in early meetings
Westhorp, Walker, Rogers,
Overbeeke, Ball and Brice
(2014), McGee and Gaventa
(2010), Papp, Gogoi and
Campbell (2013), Joshi (2010)
Traditional leader
buy-in
Traditional leaders were important
“interlocutors”, or intermediaries,
who used community trust and legit-
imacy to facilitate “relationships,
conditions and spaces” for account-
ability coalitions
• Boosted attendance by citizenry at
interface meetings
• Promoted accountability, insofar as
community members were more likely
to follow through on commitments
made in traditional leaders’ presence
Papp, Gogoi and Campbell
(2013), Tembo and Chapman
(2014)
WV Reputation and
Access to
Resources
• Long-term presence in Districts;
construction of visible organiza-
tional and physical infrastructure
(e.g. schools and participatory
committees)
• Financial and organization flexibil-
ity to make 15-year commitments
and build relationships carefully
and slowly
• Viewed as a neutral party vis-a-vis the
health system and thus capable of act-
ing as a trusted interlocutor/advisor
• Assisted community to navigate gov-
ernmental agencies including relation-
ship building, and to think through
action plan priorities and follow up
• Well positioned to come up with re-
sources for action plan implementation
To the authors’ knowledge, this
has not been closely investi-
gated in social accountability
and health literature
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accountability’ is strengthened when “relevant stakeholders estab-
lish common goals [. . .], an agreed action plan with clear responsi-
bilities for each stakeholder group, and a monitoring process [. . .]
building mutual accountability.”
Contextual factors that enable the activation of mechanisms
Realist evaluations can identify mechanisms that are activated to
greater or lesser degrees in different contexts (Dalkin, Greenhalgh,
Harvey and Walshe 2015). We identified four particular contextual
factors—outlined in Table 4—that appeared to be of critical import-
ance to the mechanisms above.
Some of these contextual factors have been found to be relevant
in other settings; others, namely the reputation of the implementing
organization, are less explored. These factors provided a scaffolding
for the conduct of CVA activities, while also being strengthened by
CVA, as part of a virtuous cycle of enhanced communication and
trust.
Outstanding questions
This research was conducted retrospectively in three districts of one
country. The outcomes and mechanisms hypothesized above require
further study, ideally in multiple sites and countries, using observa-
tional techniques and prospective approaches so that mechanisms
and context can be further elaborated, and context, mechanism, out-
come configurations can be proposed. These findings could help to
further specify the CVA program theory, and potentially create
somewhat different program theories for different contexts.
Moreover, more research is needed to gather direct accounts of the
experiences and perceptions of patients and community members
who are not members of the CVA Committee.
Our case study did not explore two important issues that are
under-addressed in the peer-reviewed literature.
The first relates to the scalability of social accountability. When
CVA communities obtain an increase in a scarce commodity that
cannot be easily produced at the local level—such as health work-
ers—these gains may come at the expense of another site. For ex-
ample, it is not clear if the transfer of new staff from other rural
areas to CVA communities is the optimal outcome from a public
health perspective. Moreover, transfers of poorly performing work-
ers outside of CVA communities may only transfer the problem; an-
other community may suffer at the hands of an inadequate or
abusive provider. It could be that one of the mechanisms of CVA is
a “squeaky wheel” phenomenon. District level officials may be will-
ing to spend extra time and effort to placate a squeaky wheel, but
they may lack the ability to do this in a scaled-up context. Also, at
least in its initial stages, CVA relies on WV’s reputation as well as
the curation and accompaniment they provide. To what extent can
this be scaled up by WV and/or replicated by other actors?
Second, there is mixed evidence—and opinions—regarding
whether externally induced social accountability projects can trans-
form power relations. We saw indications that some transform-
ations were beginning in Zambia: members of the community
overcame entrenched norms of passivity to demand answerability,
and health providers appeared to feel obligated to maintain “the
new normal”. Moreover, CVA can potentially be a game changer in-
sofar as it fosters implementation of national level strategies at the
local level. The discrepancy between evidence-based national health
objectives and on the ground implementation is much-lamented, but
we lack adequate knowledge of how to ensure “the rubber hits the
road” (Adams, Sedalia, McNab and Sarker 2015). As evidenced
with enhanced compliance with opening hours and enhanced
community consensus on development goals, CVA has the potential
to push implementation of programs that the community can easily
monitor. This in itself is transformative.
Conclusion
This study comprised a first step in a realist-informed assessment of
CVA. We identified contextual factors, mechanisms, and outcomes
that were salient in the sites we assessed in Zambia and that re-
sponded to ongoing discussions in the social accountability field.
Our findings reaffirmed the idea that CVA and similar approaches
should not be plucked from a menu of “ways to foster develop-
ment”. Rather, they should be part of a long-term, integrated, itera-
tive, and partnership-based approach to social change.
In addition to findings that are intuitive and well-supported in
the literature—such as the facilitating role traditional leaders can
play—we identified new areas that are promising areas for future re-
search. These include: (1) the context of organizational reputation;
World Vision’s perceived track record and existing relationships in
the communities appeared to facilitate cooperation from community
members and health facilities. (2) The potential relationship between
social accountability efforts and the “last mile” of global develop-
ment program implementation (i.e. making ambitious national pro-
grams operational at the frontlines of the health system). (3) The
potential relationship between social accountability efforts and the
capacity of communities, health providers, and even district officials
to advocate and operate effectively in a newly de-centralized con-
text. (4) The feasibility of scale up for certain types of local level re-
sponsiveness. Could district authorities handle CVA in all of the
villages in their remit? Together, these findings offer theoretical
propositions and empirical questions to be explored in future social
accountability research.
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